Let’s start with this fact — the overwhelming majority of Muslims are not crazed, murderous fanatics. It is a meme the West uses to justify genocide against. In fact, we now have clear evidence, in the person of Syria’s new leader, that the US provided direct support to a terrorist group that descended from ISIS.
US Ambassador Jim Jeffrey described Syria’s current leader, Mohammad al Jolani, who was the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham HTSS, as necessary partners in the chaotic Syrian landscape, despite their extremist views, to prevent worse outcomes like full Russian/Iranian control or ISIS resurgence. Starting in 2017, the US State Department listed HTS as one of the top ten most active terrorist groups in the world, and the US placed a $10 million bounty on his head.
Jeffrey, in a Frontline piece produced by PBS, said the following:
Look, he’s [Jolani] the least bad option of the various options on Idlib, which is one of the most important places in Syria, which is one of the most important places right now in the Middle East…. When there is not the normal setup of nation-states and of international norms and rules, you wind up with groups like this, that do things you don’t like but in the here and now are the folks you have to deal with to avoid even worse things.
Jeffrey admitted to indirect communications with HTS during the Trump administration, including receiving and sending messages via intermediaries. He confirmed: “Yes” (to receiving messages from HTS), elaborating: “Basically, ‘We want to be your friend. We’re not terrorists. We’re just fighting Assad.'” He explained his response:
I encouraged people to keep me informed as often as possible. That was my job…. I received and sent messages to HTS.
The United States has played a dangerous game — declaring Islamic-based terrorism as a threat to justify military intervention, while providing support — including funding — to several of those Sunni Salafists to carry out regime destabilizing operations throughout West Asia and in the Caucasus region. This included support to the Chechen rebels in Russia, which launched a 10-year war starting in 1999.
I made the mistake in the past of equating Al-Qaeda as a Salafist entity. With the benefit of hindsight, Bin Laden’s group, although motivated by their religion, was an anti-imperialist movement directed at the United States. Al Qaeda’s leaders, particularly Ayman al-Zawahiri, publicly opposed many of ISIS’s actions, leading to a formal split between the groups in 2014. This opposition stemmed from ideological, strategic, and tactical differences, with Al Qaeda criticizing ISIS for its extreme brutality, sectarian focus, illegitimate declaration of a caliphate, and attacks on fellow jihadists and civilians, which they viewed as counterproductive to the broader jihadist cause. That cause was erasing US influence in West Asia.
As a public service, particularly for US citizens unfamiliar with Islam, I want to attempt to define three terms: Wahhabism, Salafism and Takfiri. I am sure there are Islamic scholars who may take issue with my attempt to clarify the meaning of these words. I apologize in advance for my errors. But there are some important nuances here that Americans must understand in order to not be blinded by hate, and end up supporting self-destructive policies and interventions, especially in West Asia.
WAHHABISM
Wahhabism is a strict, puritanical reform movement within Sunni Islam founded in the 18th century by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in what is now Saudi Arabia. It is a subset of Salafism, advocating a return to the practices of the Salaf al-Salih (the “pious predecessors” of the first three generations of Muslims), emphasizing a literalist interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah (Prophet Muhammad’s teachings) and rejecting innovations (bid‘ah) or practices deemed un-Islamic, such as saint veneration or certain Sufi rituals.
Core Tenets
Tawhid (Monotheism): Central to Wahhabism is the absolute oneness of God, rejecting any form of shirk (polytheism), including shrine worship or intercession by saints.
Rejection of Bid‘ah: Wahhabis condemn practices not explicitly supported by early Islamic texts, such as celebrating the Prophet’s birthday or elaborate rituals.
Strict Jurisprudence: Relies on Hanbali fiqh (Islamic law) and direct interpretation of texts, often bypassing later scholarly traditions.
Moral Enforcement: Emphasizes enforcing Islamic morality, historically through practices like destroying shrines or enforcing dress codes.
Wahhabism is often considered a precursor to or a branch of Salafism, sharing its focus on early Islam and rejection of innovations. However, not all Salafists identify as Wahhabis, and some modern Salafists distance themselves from the term due to its association with Saudi politics or extremism. Wahhabis are sometimes called “Salafists of the Najd” (referring to their Arabian origin), distinguishing them from broader Salafi movements.
SALAFIST
The term Salafist (or Salafi) refers to a follower of Salafism, an ultraconservative, reformist movement within Sunni Islam that advocates a return to the practices and beliefs of the Salaf al-Salih (“pious predecessors”), the first three generations of Muslims (roughly 610–710 CE). These include the Prophet Muhammad, his companions (Sahaba), their followers (Tabi‘un), and the next generation (Tabi‘ al-Tabi‘in). Salafists aim to emulate this era’s perceived pure, unadulterated Islam, rejecting later innovations (bid‘ah) and emphasizing strict adherence to the Quran, Sunnah (Prophet’s traditions), and a literalist interpretation of Islamic texts.
Salafism is not monolithic and includes three main tendencies:
Purist/Quietist Salafism: Focuses on personal piety, education, and avoiding politics. Common in Saudi Arabia, these Salafists prioritize religious purity and often align with state authorities, rejecting rebellion (e.g., scholars like Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymin).
Political/Activist Salafism: Engages in political reform, often criticizing Muslim governments for un-Islamic policies while avoiding violence. They may support democratic processes or social activism.
Jihadi-Salafism: A militant minority that justifies violence to establish Islamic governance, often linked to groups like al-Qaeda or ISIS. They use Salafist rhetoric but are condemned by other Salafists for extremism and takfir (declaring Muslims apostates). For example, jihadi-Salafists like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi fueled sectarian violence in Iraq.
Salafism emerged in the 19th century as a response to Western colonialism and perceived Islamic decline, influenced by scholars like Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (founder of Wahhabism, a Salafist precursor) and later by Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh. It gained traction in the 20th century, fueled by Saudi Arabia’s global promotion of Wahhabi-Salafist teachings through mosques and schools. Estimates suggest 50-100 million Salafists worldwide, with significant presence in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and diaspora communities.
Critics, including many Muslims, view Salafism as rigid, intolerant, or a gateway to extremism, especially due to jihadi-Salafist actions. Shia and Sufi groups often face Salafist criticism for practices deemed un-Islamic.
Core Beliefs and Practices
Theological Foundation: Salafists prioritize tawhid (God’s absolute oneness), opposing practices they view as polytheistic (shirk), like venerating saints or shrines. They rely heavily on hadith (Prophet’s sayings) and reject speculative theology (kalam).
Rejection of Innovation: They oppose practices not explicitly endorsed by the Salaf, such as certain Sufi rituals or modern cultural influences, viewing them as deviations.
Scriptural Literalism: Salafists advocate a direct, text-based approach, often bypassing traditional Islamic legal schools (e.g., Hanafi, Maliki) in favor of their own interpretations of primary sources.
TAKFIRI
The term Takfiri is an Arabic word derived from “takfir,” which refers to the act of a Muslim declaring another Muslim an apostate (kafir, meaning “unbeliever”) who has abandoned Islam. A Takfiri is a Muslim who engages in this practice, accusing fellow Muslims of apostasy, often to justify violence or exclusion against them. This declaration is considered serious in Islamic jurisprudence, as traditional interpretations reserve such judgments for Islamic scholars (ulama) under strict conditions, like denying core tenets of faith (e.g., the five pillars). Misuse of takfir is widely viewed as a major sin, with one hadith stating that wrongly declaring a Muslim an unbeliever makes the accuser themselves guilty of minor shirk (associating partners with God).
Historically, the term is tied to extremist groups like the 7th-century Kharijites, who used takfir against both Sunni and Shia Muslims, fueling insurrections. In modern contexts, Takfiri ideology is associated with jihadist groups (e.g., ISIS, al-Qaeda, GIA, Boko Haram) who label Muslims, governments, or entire societies as apostates to sanction attacks, often citing thinkers like Sayyid Qutb or Ibn Taymiyyah. For example, during the Algerian Civil War (1991–2002), the GIA declared civilians and non-members kafir, justifying massacres. Mainstream Muslim scholars, such as Hasan al-Hudaybi and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, denounce Takfiri practices as un-Islamic and divisive, emphasizing that only God can fully judge faith.
The term is also politically charged. Shia groups, like Iran’s regime, use “Takfiri” pejoratively against Sunni militants (e.g., labeling all anti-Syrian regime fighters as Takfiris), while Sunni extremists apply it to Shias or secular Muslims. On platforms like X, it’s debated as a divisive label, with some users framing it as a tool to demonize ideological opponents or protect orthodoxy, while others criticize its misuse to stoke sectarianism. In essence, Takfiri describes those who weaponize excommunication within Islam, often with violent consequences, though its application varies by context and user.
Here is the ultimate irony — some of the most passionate Salafists are not religious. They use the words and concepts to justify violence, such as what is now unfolding in Syria. I believe that the vast majority of Islamic clerics eschew violence as the path forward. I await your push-back.