Trump’s Oil Confabulations

May 30, 2026

(The preceding image is provided by my friend, “Cardiff.”)

Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed that the United States is producing more oil than Russia and Saudi Arabia combined. He has made this statement multiple times in 2026, often emphasizing it as a result of his “Drill, Baby, Drill” policies. Only one little problem… It ain’t exactly true.

According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), US crude oil production grew by 3%, or 350,000 barrels per day, in 2025, setting a new annual production record of 13.6 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production, prior to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on 28 February, was approximately 10.086 million barrels per day, up slightly from 10.073 million bpd in December 2025. And Russia? In 2025, Russia produced 9.1–9.3 million barrels per day.

Trump’s claim is technically accurate only if we count total petroleum liquids — i.e., crude oil + natural gas liquids like ethane, propane, butane, plus refinery processing gain and other liquids. Using this broad definition, it is true that the US produces a total of 23–24 million barrels per day versus Russia and Saudi Arabia’s combined output of 21–22 million barrels per day.

But here’s the problem… The US is NOT energy independent. I want to encourage you to watch Danny Davis’ conversation with Art Berman (click here). When Trump boasts about the US being the world’s largest oil producer, he is telling a misleading story. It is true that he US produces enormous volumes of oil, but the type of oil it produces doesn’t fully match what its refinery infrastructure and economy actually need, making continued imports not just economically convenient but structurally necessary.

Art Berman, a petroleum geologist and energy consultant, argues cogently that the current global oil supply crisis — primarily triggered by disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz due to the ongoing US-Israel-Iran war— will not resolve quickly. He presents a realistic, data-driven view that contrasts sharply with optimistic statements from the Trump administration about US oil production and prices.

I was pleased to hear Berman make the same argument I have made since the shuttering of the Strait of Hormuz: i.e., That the closure/blockade (via mines, attacks, and US actions) has removed a massive volume of oil from global markets (roughly 20% of seaborne trade). This is a shock without historical precedent and with no easy or fast workaround. Inventories are being drawn down rapidly, and the lag effects will hit hard in the coming months.

The most fascinating part of Berman’s analysis was his claim that the US is not, contrary to Trump’s claims, energy independent when it comes to oil. US shale production is overwhelmingly light sweet crude (low density, low sulfur). However, America’s refinery infrastructure — particularly the massive Gulf Coast refining complex — was built and optimized decades ago to process heavy sour crude. Because of this, the US must import heavy crude from Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and others to feed existing refineries, while it exports its light shale oil to Asia and Europe.

The US is dependent on heavy sour crude because of the central role of diesel in the US economy. The US economy runs heavily on diesel, which is best produced from heavy crude… Trucks, trains, farm equipment, construction machinery, and home heating oil in the Northeast all depend on distillate fuels produced from heavy crude. Since US shale doesn’t yield enough heavy fractions to meet domestic diesel demand, our economy is structurally vulnerable to a disruption imports remain structurally necessary regardless of how much light crude is produced.

This fact casts a new light on Trump’s January invasion of Venezuela. In March 2025, Saudi Arabia ranked only 4th among US crude oil suppliers at 196,000 b/d, behind Canada (3.8 million b/d), Mexico (397,000 b/d), and Venezuela (253,000 b/d). Since the capture of Maduro, however, US imports of Venezuelan heavy crude roughly tripled — from around 99,000 bpd in December 2025 to nearly 500,000+ bpd by early 2026 — representing one of the most dramatic shifts in US crude import patterns in years, and directly addressing the heavy crude supply gap I identified earlier.

In light of this it seems reasonable to ask… Did the Trump administration anticipate the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and used the capture of Maduro as a pretext to boost heavy crude oil imports from Venezuela? Makes you go, hmmmm.

A crazy, busy podcast day. I started with Nima and Colonel Wilkerson:

Had my first chat with Miroslav of the Czech Republic… a sweet kid:

Sabby Sabs grabbed me to discuss the drone strike in Romania… Despite early attempts to blame it on Russia, the Romanian President later admitted it was an errant drone brought down by electronic warfare: