What Does the Trump National Security Strategy Mean for Iran?

A good question. The 2025 National Security Strategy actually offers very little substance on Iran as a threat… It is largely ignored. An Iranian journalist reached out to me today about the implications of the NSS for Iranian/US relations and asked me to answer several questions. Here are my answers:

Given Tom Barack’s admission of the failure of America’s interventionist policies towards Iran, does this mean a change in Washington’s approach to diplomacy and dialogue with Tehran, or is it merely a superficial change in the tone of American officials’ speeches?

Short answer… I think it is a superficial change. The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), released by the Trump administration on December 4, 2025, marks a significant rhetorical shift from the 2022 Biden-era document, emphasizing “America First” non-interventionism, economic priorities, and reduced focus on the Middle East. Iran receives only cursory treatment—far less emphasis than in prior strategies—portrayed as a diminished regional threat following U.S. and Israeli military actions.

The NSS portrays Iran as “the region’s chief destabilizing force,” but asserts it has been “greatly weakened by Israeli actions since October 7, 2023, and President Trump’s June 2025 Operation Midnight Hammer, which significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear program.”

Trump’s apparent willingness to put Iran as a secondary priority hinges on his belief that the US obliterated Iran”s nuclear facility at Fordow on June 23, 2025. If evidence emerges that Iran has re-constituted its nuclear enrichment program, then Trump’s previous claim will be obliterated and he will face pressure from Israel to take renewed military action against Iran.

Next question:

Can Barack’s statements that Trump is ready for real talks with Iran be seen as a positive sign for improving relations between the two countries, or is this just a political tactic for specific purposes?

In the last four months, President Trump’s public comments on potential negotiations with Iran have been limited but consistent in tone: expressing openness to a “deal” while tying it to strict U.S. conditions and emphasizing military deterrence as leverage.

During an October 13, 2025 interview with Reuters, Trump stated, “We are ready when you are and it will be the best decision that Iran has ever made, and it’s going to happen,” referring to a potential nuclear and regional stability agreement. He framed it as an opportunity for Iran to avoid further U.S.-Israeli pressure, echoing his “maximum pressure” campaign but signaling willingness for talks if Tehran curbs its nuclear program and proxy activities.

On December 1, 2025, Trump reportedly sent a private message to Iran through Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, outlining three preconditions for resuming negotiations: (1) zero uranium enrichment, (2) cessation of support for regional proxies (e.g., Houthis, Hezbollah), and (3) recognition of Israel’s right to exist. This was confirmed by a senior Iranian lawmaker and aligns with the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (released December 4), which downplays Iran as a “greatly weakened” threat but vows to keep the Strait of Hormuz open.

The question of new bilateral talks is better described as a symbolic gesture rather than a genuine effort to secure peace through diplomacy. Trump’s alleged preconditions — zero uranium enrichment, cessation of support for regional proxies (e.g., Houthis, Hezbollah), and recognition of Israel’s right to exist — are terms that Iran will not accept… Therefore, there is little chance of a sincere bi-lateral diplomatic opening.

Given Barack’s statements that regime change in Iran is not the current policy of the United States and that differences should be resolved through dialogue with neighboring countries, does this change in approach mean accepting Iran’s role as a key player in regional security and stability, and how could it affect Iran’s relations with its neighbors and global powers?

I think Barack’s statements should be viewed with great skepticism. I see no evidence that the US is serious about engaging Iran diplomatically, and is willing to acknowledge and accept Iran as a legitimate regimen. If Barack’s response to the interviewer who asked him about regime change actually reflect a shift in US policy, then this shift signals a tacit acceptance of Iran’s entrenched role as a pivotal (if contentious) actor in regional dynamics, rather than pursuing its isolation or overthrow. Barrack’s comments frame Iran not as an existential threat to be eliminated, but as a “destabilizing force” that can be managed through incentives and deterrence. This would be a smart decision by Trump, but I think the pro-Zionist members of his administration will prevent adopting such a policy shift.

Next question:

What level of deterrence do you foresee Iran’s power at? Has it weakened compared to before or has it recovered well after the war? To what extent did the Israeli and American attacks set back or weaken Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities? Are Netanyahu and Trump’s claims about eliminating these capabilities true?

Let me start with the last question first… Netanyahu and Trump are wrong in believing that they have significantly weakened, or even eliminated, Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities. I believe that Iran’s missile capabilities have not been diminished, and that the Iranian nuclear program, especially the ability to process uranium, has not been significantly degraded. I would note that the US intelligence assessments (from the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Command) following the bombing — the DIA assessment in particular — believed that the strikes set back Iran’s nuclear breakout timeline (time to produce weapons-grade uranium) by less than 6 months, with core components (e.g., centrifuges for enrichment) remaining largely intact underground. Aboveground structures (e.g., power supplies, entry points) suffered moderate to severe damage (estimated 40–60% based on satellite imagery from CSIS and Carnegie analyses), but underground halls at Natanz and Fordow were not collapsed, allowing potential resumption in 2–6 months with repairs.

If anything, Iran’s military capabilities are more formidable now as compared to 12 June 2025 because Iran has embraced offers of military assistance, especially in the realm of air defense, from both Russia and China. Iran also learned some painful lessons from Israel’s failed attempt to decapitate the Iranian political and military leaders on June 13. In an ironic twist, the Zionist attack on 13 June has made Iran stronger, not weaker.

What is Iran’s greatest strength against the United States? What are Iran’s current leverages?

Iran’s greatest strength is the same metric used to place the value on a real estate transaction… Location, location, location. The current size of the US military ground forces are incapable of invading and defeating Iran. While the US can launch air strikes against Iranian targets, Iran’s air defense systems — which have been bolstered by Russia and China — have a better chance now of fending off a US attack. The US, short of using nuclear weapons, does not presently, nor in the foreseeable future, have the capability to subjugate Iran by military force. Iran’s expanded military cooperation with Russia and China, along with its expanding economic ties with BRICS nations, put it in a stronger position vis-a-vis the United States.

Last question:

In Iraq, does Iran or the United States have the upper hand, and which one has more influence over the appointment of the prime minister?

While Iraq remains a contested arena for US and Iranian influence, shaped by sectarian politics, economic leverage, and security dynamics, Iran’s entrenched ties to Shia militias and political blocs give it a structural edge in day-to-day governance. Iran-backed groups like the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Coordination Framework (a Shia alliance) control key levers in Baghdad, influencing legislation, security, and resource allocation. Recent reports highlight Iranian proxies pressuring the government to reverse decisions on designating terror groups, underscoring Tehran’s veto power. Iran’s economic lifeline to Iraq (e.g., $1B+ in annual trade and electricity/gas supplies) further entrenches this.

I believe that Iran has greater influence, leveraging its dominance in Shia politics to shape candidates and veto outsiders. The process—parliamentary nomination followed by presidential endorsement—favors Tehran’s allies. The Coordination Framework (Iran-aligned) holds ~150 of 329 seats post-2025 elections, enabling it to nominate and back PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani (pro-Iran technocrat appointed 2022, eyeing a second term). In addition, Najaf’s Shia clergy (Iran-influenced) and militias can block nominees, as in Sudani’s selection over US-favored alternatives.

On the podcast front, I did my usual Friday gigs with Nima and with the Judge and Ray. I also am posting my latest conversation with Andrei Martyanov: