THE IRANIAN COUNTERSTRIKE OPTION

Here is the latest from Karl Miller:

CONTROLLING JUDGMENT
A major US-Israeli campaign against Iran would create a credible risk of retaliatory pressure against the most concentrated Israeli fuel systems first, followed by wider pressure against GCC refining, LNG, power-water, storage and export systems if those states are perceived as enabling the campaign. The strategic danger is not a single damaged facility. It is the possibility that several tightly coupled systems fail faster than substitute supply, repair capacity and emergency logistics can be mobilized.

For defensive analysis, the report assumes that the first retaliatory pressure would fall on Israel because Israel would be a direct combatant and because its domestic fuel system is concentrated in two refineries. The model then examines a widening second stage in which selected GCC systems could face pressure if Gulf airspace, bases, logistics, intelligence, energy support or political alignment were viewed as materially supporting the campaign.

The regional system is composed of several national networks that appear diverse at a map scale but depend on a limited number of refineries, LNG trains, shared utilities, storage systems, marine terminals and pipeline corridors. The same physical and commercial dependencies recur across every jurisdiction: reliable power, control systems, product segregation, marine access, spare equipment, qualified personnel and insurance acceptance.

Israel has no geographically diversified domestic refining system. Haifa/Bazan and Ashdod carry effectively the entire national burden for diesel and jet/kerosene production. The larger Haifa complex supplies approximately two-thirds of the combined middle-distillate baseline and roughly 70 percent of diesel. Ashdod is the only substantial domestic alternative if Haifa becomes unavailable.

Haifa/Bazan is the central Israeli fuel-security exposure because it combines the largest refining burden with interconnected support systems. A future disruption would not need to eliminate every crude or conversion unit to create a national deficit. Loss of electrical integration, steam, hydrogen, internal transfer, controls, tankage or product certification could constrain several process trains simultaneously.

Under the planning case, Haifa provides approximately 57.6 kb/d of diesel and 10.7 kb/d of jet/kerosene. If Haifa were unavailable and Ashdod remained operational, domestic middle-distillate supply would fall to approximately 36 kb/d. Against an 88 kb/d sustained requirement, the replacement requirement would be approximately 52 kb/d before allowing for stock rebuilding, distribution losses or quality constraints.

Ashdod is strategically important less because of its absolute size than because it is the only substantial domestic refining alternative. If Ashdod alone were unavailable while Haifa remained operational, the sustained-case deficit would be approximately 19.7 kb/d. That deficit could be manageable through diversified cargoes and controlled stock draw only if reception, certification, storage and internal distribution remained effective.

If both refineries were unavailable, domestic middle-distillate output would fall from approximately 104.3 kb/d to zero. Approximately 88 kb/d would then need to come from accessible inventories and imports under the sustained case. This would exceed ordinary spot-market replacement and would require exceptional allied allocation, government direction and functioning delivery access.

The most plausible immediate retaliatory pressure would center on Israel because its fuel system is concentrated, its military posture is highly fuel dependent and its ability to replace a two-refinery loss would depend on uninterrupted reception and finite stocks. A wider campaign against GCC systems would create the larger regional and global consequence by degrading refining, LNG, power-water, storage, ports and alternative export routes at the same time. The decisive contest would be between the speed of systemic disruption and the speed of substitution, repair and commercial re-entry.

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